According to the "Mill hypothesis", the tax burden from indirect taxation is underestimated because indirect taxes are less "visible" than direct taxes. We experimentally test the Mill hypothesis and identify tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion. We find that the tax burden associated with an indirect tax is underestimated, whereas this is not the case with an equivalent direct tax. In a referendum to tax and redistribute tax revenue, fiscal illusion is found to distort democratic decisions and to result in "excessive" redistribution. Yet, voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion.
Introduction
"Perhaps ... the money which [the taxpayer] is required to pay directly out of his pocket is the only taxation which he is quite sure that he pays at all. ... If all taxes were direct, taxation would be much more perceived than at present; and there would be a security which now there is not, for economy in the public expenditure." John Stuart Mill (1848: 237) The quotation above summarizes the "Mill hypothesis" of fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion prevails if people are prone to systematic misperception of the tax burden. The Mill hypothesis suggests a particularly relevant aspect of taxation as a cause fiscal illusion: the relative "invisibility" of indirect taxes as compared to more "visible" direct taxes. Taxpayers may systematically underestimate the tax burden from indirect taxes as compared to direct taxes because indirect taxes are incorporated into (and therefore "hidden" in) the prices of goods. This hypothesis about a cause of fiscal illusion has a long intellectual pedigree (see Buchanan 1967 , Schmölders 1960 .
Fiscal illusion may have important consequences because of its potential to distort democratic decisions on fiscal issues. The Mill hypothesis suggests that fiscal illusion may lead to "excessive" public expenditure (see quotation above). Government spending is considered to be "excessive" if a tax-expenditure package is implemented which voterstaxpayers would have opposed had they correctly perceived the resulting tax burden.
Therefore, fiscal illusion is a candidate explanation for the dramatic increase in government spending experienced in many countries during the 20 th century (e.g., Mueller 2002: Ch.
19.7). For example, U.S. government expenditures as a percentage of GNP have increased by
approximately 500 percent over the last nine decades (Holsey and Borcherding 1997: 563) . Of course, the massive government growth has several causes. In fact, various explanations which do not refer to fiscal illusion, but are based on the assumption that all agents are rational have been suggested to account for this phenomenon (e.g., Becker and Mulligan 1998) .
Despite the considerable number of empirical studies on fiscal illusion available to date, the Mill hypothesis has not been tested so far. As will be argued in section 2 in more detail, it is difficult to measure a misperception of the tax burden, and it appears to be impossible to unambiguously show with survey studies or field data that excessive government spending is a consequence of fiscal illusion (see Oates 1988, Dollery and Worthington 1996 for detailed reviews). In particular, the available empirical research methods did not allow to distinguish between the rationality-based and the illusion-based explanations.
We suggest an experimental approach to test the Mill hypothesis about the causes and consequences of fiscal illusion. Experimental techniques allow for control of preferences and information conditions, and this control is necessary to discriminate between rationality-based and illusion-based explanations. We present an experimental design appropriate to investigate whether tax framing is a cause, and whether excessive redistribution is a consequence of fiscal illusion. To do so, we provide a novel combination of two well-established lines of experimental research. We combine a competitive experimental market (e.g., Smith et al. 1982 ) with an experimental voting study (see Palfrey 1991) . In our experiment, subjects earn income in a competitive experimental market from trading, and vote on a proposal to tax market transactions and to redistribute tax revenues. The tax is either framed as a "visible" direct tax or an "invisible" indirect tax. Except for the framing the two tax regimes are perfectly equivalent. In our experiment, subjects can repeatedly vote on the tax-redistribution proposal. A particular sequencing of tax frames is implemented allowing us to study whether people eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion.
With respect to the causes of fiscal illusion, our results show that the tax burden resulting from indirect taxation is systematically underestimated, whereas this is not the case with direct taxation. With respect to the consequences of fiscal illusion, we show that fiscal illusion induces inexperienced voters to approve of a tax-redistribution proposal which is not in their material self-interest. In particular, we find that redistribution is accepted in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is indirect, while it is rejected in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is direct. However, we also find significant effects of learning from experience. When the referendum is repeated under constant conditions, fiscal illusion is still present at the individual level, but ceases to have significant effects on redistribution. If voters who are experienced in one tax frame are confronted with the other tax frame (e.g., those who voted on financing redistribution with direct taxes twice now vote on financing it by indirect taxes),
we find no effect of fiscal illusion. Therefore, subjects not only learn from experience, but also seem to be able to do "transfer learning" (Cooper and Kagel 2003) .
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses empirical problems in identifying the causes and consequences of fiscal illusion by means of survey studies and field data.
Section 3 provides a description of the experimental design. Section 4 reports the results, and section 5 concludes the paper.
Requirements for testing the Mill hypothesis
This section discusses the requirements that have to be met by an empirical investigation to test the Mill hypothesis, i.e., to unambiguously show whether (i) fiscal illusion exists, (ii) fiscal illusion is caused by tax framing, (iii) excessive government activity is a consequence of fiscal illusion, and whether (iv) voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion, if it exists at all. These requirements are very demanding. To our knowledge, neither survey nor econometric studies are available which fulfill all requirements. We claim that the experimental design presented in section 3 meets all of the requirements explained below.
(i) To be able to show that fiscal illusion exists, the individual perception of the tax burden resulting from a particular tax has to be measured. Several survey studies have investigated the "visibility" of various taxes (e.g., Schokkaert 1988, Cullis and Lewis 1985) .
Economists tend to be skeptical about the reliability of survey studies because respondents have no incentives to report their perception thoughtfully or truthfully. A more important limitation of survey studies is that they do not provide any indication of the extent of misperception of the tax burden. 1 To evaluate whether there is misperception, one has to compare the true tax burden an individual bears with his or her perception of the tax burden.
Unfortunately, even specialized economists disagree on the tax burden of indirect taxes (see for example, the debate on the "double dividend" from indirect taxes on energy). Therefore, it appears to be difficult to establish even the very existence of fiscal illusion (however, for interesting attempts see Gemmell et al. 1999 or Fujii and Hawley 1988) .
1 In contrast to economic incidence (which determines the tax burden), a misperception of the legal incidence is easy to measure. For example, Boeri et al. (2001: 23) ask respondents: "As you know, both employers and employees pay pension contributions. Which fraction of your gross monthly salary/wage goes to public pensions? (Please take into account also your employer contributions)." The authors find that in France 52 percent of respondents underestimate this fraction while only 4 percent overestimate the fraction. In Germany, 45 percent underestimate and 13 percent overestimate, and in Spain the respective figures are 68 and 5 percent.
(ii) Suppose the problems mentioned in (i) could somehow be solved, i.e., suppose the misperception of the tax burden from a particular tax could be reliably measured. To be able to show that tax framing causes this misperception, the researcher would have to find two taxes that are identical with respect to the tax burden, and to compare the relative misperception associated with these taxes. This is so because a framing effect prevails if different representations of the objectively same situation provoke different cognitive evaluations of the situation (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) . For example, a researcher would have to find a tax reform in which taxpayers are first exposed to a direct tax, then to an indirect tax which is shifted to taxpayers to such an extent that the resulting tax burden is the same in both cases. He could then (in principle) measure and compare the misperception in both cases. Unfortunately, such a natural experiment appears to be difficult to find.
(iii) Suppose the problems discussed in (i) and (ii) could be solved, i.e., suppose that it is possible to identify tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion. conditions. While such referenda are held in some places (e.g., in Switzerland), they take place under widely varying economic and political conditions.
In view of the insufficient quality of available field data, Wallace E. Oates (1988: 66) concludes in his survey that the empirical "literature has not made a persuasive case for [the] existence and importance" of fiscal illusion. 2 The main reason is that field observations which are consistent with the fiscal illusion hypothesis, are usually also consistent with hypotheses based on the assumption of fully rational agents (e.g., Marshall 1991).
3. An experimental approach to fiscal illusion
Experimental design and hypotheses
This experimental study compares behavior in two treatments. In both treatments, subjects first participate in a competitive experimental market where they earn market income from trading. In both treatments, subjects vote in a referendum on a proposal to tax market transactions and to redistribute tax revenues. If the proposal passes, the tax-redistribution scheme is implemented. If the proposal fails, trading continues as before. The two treatments exclusively differ by the sequence of tax regimes. Redistribution is either financed by a transaction tax levied on buyers or sellers. As a consequence of our parameter choices, the transaction tax cannot be shifted if levied on the buyers, but is fully shifted in equilibrium if levied on the sellers. By definition, direct taxes are taxes which cannot be shifted, whereas indirect taxes can be shifted. 3 Therefore, the two tax regimes exclusively differ by whether redistribution is financed by a direct tax or by an indirect tax.
Figure 1 serves two purposes. First, it illustrates the basic idea of our experiment.
Second, the figure is drawn using actual experimental parameters. These will be explained in detail in section 3.2, and the figure serves as a reference for that discussion. In both treatments, subjects first trade under the same market conditions (induced supply and demand S 0 , D 0 ). If a transaction tax is levied on the buyers (left part of figure 1), the demand schedule is shifted down to D 1 . Since demand and supply intersect in the perfectly inelastic range of demand, the imposition of the tax affects neither the equilibrium price nor the equilibrium quantity. Since the direct tax cannot be shifted in equilibrium, the entire tax burden is borne by the buyers. If a transaction tax is levied on the sellers (right part of figure 1), the supply schedule is shifted up to S 1 . The imposition of the tax does not affect the equilibrium quantity, but causes equilibrium prices to rise exactly by the amount of the tax. That is, the indirect tax is fully shifted to the buyers, and the entire tax burden is borne by the buyers. Therefore, the tax burden is the same in both tax regimes, and the two regimes are perfectly equivalent in economic terms. This follows from the proposition of tax liability side equivalence which claims that the same rent distribution prevails in equilibrium irrespective of whether the tax is levied on the buyers or on the sellers (see e.g., Kotlikoff and Summers 1987) .
When subjects vote on the proposal to introduce the tax and redistribute a part of the revenues, they know all market parameters and the terms of the proposal in detail. Therefore, they possess sufficient information to take a rational voting decision. In particular, subjects know that the amount of money redistributed to subjects is smaller than the tax revenue in both treatments. A rational voter approves of the proposal if the proposal increases his net income. Since the entire tax burden is borne by buyers and their per capita income from redistribution is smaller than their per capita tax burden in equilibrium, rational buyers will reject the proposal in both treatments.
Even though the treatments are identical in terms of equilibrium incomes, they may not be cognitively identical. We hypothesize that the framing of taxation (i.e., direct vs. indirect taxation) systematically affects the perception of the tax burden. In particular, we hypothesize that the tax burden resulting from direct taxation is "transparent" whereas the tax burden resulting from indirect taxation is "intransparent" to subjects. The reason for this intransparency is that subjects have to perceive that the indirect tax will be incorporated into prices. As a consequence, we call the tax regime with direct taxes the Transparent Tax (TT), and the regime with indirect taxes the Intransparent Tax (IT). More specifically, we hypothesize that the tax burden from indirect taxation will be underestimated compared to perfectly equivalent direct taxation. If this underestimation is pronounced enough, some buyers may hold the illusionary belief to gain from redistribution. This illusionary belief may then induce them to vote for redistribution when it is financed by indirect taxes, but not when it is financed by direct taxes.
In the following, we argue that our design is appropriate to investigate whether (i) fiscal illusion exists, (ii) tax framing causes fiscal illusion, and (iii) fiscal illusion distorts fiscal choices in a referendum, and whether (iv) voters learn to overcome fiscal illusion.
(i) To investigate whether there is fiscal illusion at all, we have to measure a subject's actual perception of the tax burden and to determine to what extent this perception is erroneous. Subjects are asked to provide expectations about market prices and quantities in case of rejection and acceptance of the referendum. From these expectations the expected change in net income can be calculated (see section 4.2 for details). As will be shown below, we do observe systematic differences between perceived and actual changes in net income in the two tax frames.
(ii) To isolate tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion we need to implement a ceteris paribus variation in which only the representation but not the rent distribution is varied. For the two types of taxes to produce identical economic outcomes, tax liability side equivalence must hold. For this equivalence to hold, markets must equilibrate. As a consequence, we chose an experimental market institution that rapidly converges to competitive equilibrium outcomes.
(iii) To isolate the consequences of fiscal illusion, i.e., to be able to show that fiscal illusion distorts voting decisions, we have to eliminate other factors which may also distort voting decisions as far as possible. If a buyer is inequality averse he or she may vote for redistribution in order to reduce income inequality. To avoid this type of confound, we use automated sellers instead of human subjects in the role of sellers. These automated sellers trade according to pre-specified and commonly known rules on the market (see section 3.2 for details), but they do not vote.
Rapid equilibration of the experimental market is not only important to isolate tax framing as a cause of fiscal illusion as explained in (ii) above. It is also important to unambiguously identify the consequences of fiscal illusion. We explained earlier that buyers lose net income in equilibrium if the proposal passes. This is not necessarily the case if markets do not equilibrate. Suppose, for example, that market prices adjust very slowly to the indirect tax. Suppose a buyer correctly anticipates such a disequilibrium price path and approves of the proposal. This voting decision is not the result of fiscal illusion (no misperception) but of a market in disequilibrium. To avoid this type of confound we chose a market institution which is known to equilibrate quickly.
(iv) To investigate whether voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion, we let subjects vote three times on the proposal. We vary the sequence of the tax regimes across treatments to assess whether experience learning and transfer learning can explain a vanishing effect of fiscal illusion on redistribution.
Procedures and parameters
Subjects first participate in a competitive experimental market where they earn market income (see Phase 0 in figure 2). Subjects then go through 3 phases, each consisting of two parts. The first part is a referendum on a proposal to tax subsequent market transactions and to redistribute the revenues from this tax to market participants. The second part of a phase is a series of 15 market periods in which subjects earn market incomes, and receive income from redistributed tax revenues if the proposal has been accepted. If the proposal has been rejected the same conditions as in phase 0 prevail.
The treatments exclusively differ by the sequence of tax regimes (see figure 2) . In treatment TT-TT-IT, participants vote on a referendum to finance redistribution by a direct tax in phases 1 and 2, followed by an in direct tax. In treatment IT-IT-TT, the 1 st and 2 nd referendum is on an indirect tax, followed by a direct tax. 
Experimental market
The competitive experimental market is a computerized two-sided auction with 4 human buyers and 2 automated sellers. Each of the 4 buyers can buy at most two units having a value of v i = 140 points each, and total supply by the 2 automated sellers is 12 units (see figure 1 and In both treatments, buyers bear the full tax burden and lose net income in equilibrium.
The following calculation shows that this is indeed the case, using TT as an example (see also The competitive market we use is a uniform price sealed bid/offer auction. 4 In this auction, buyers can submit integer bids for each unit they can buy. The automated sellers are programmed to submit offers for each unit equal to the true unit costs. After the decision time 5 has elapsed, the bids are ordered from highest to lowest, and the offers from lowest to highest.
The first q bids higher or equal than the first q offers are accepted. If bids are tied, priority is given randomly. The uniform market-clearing price is set equal to the q th (= last accepted) bid, and the number of transactions is q. The instructions provide subjects with full information on all market parameters, the programming of the automated sellers, and the price and quantity determination rule.
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Proposal and voting rules
At the beginning of each of the 3 main phases, buyers vote on a proposal (see figure 2 ).
Subjects are handed out instructions explaining the proposal and the rules of the referendum in great detail. Only the 4 buyers can vote, and the referendum is anonymous. Each voter 4 See Smith et al. (1982) for a detailed description of the sealed bid/offer auction. We did not use the double auction (which is well-known for its capacity to generate competitive equilibria) because it is very difficult to simulate sellers in this auction. 5 Decision time was gradually reduced from 60 seconds (first market period) to 25 seconds (last market period).
either approves or disapproves, abstentions are not possible. If at least two voters approve of the proposal, the redistribution scheme is implemented for the following 15 market periods. If the proposal is rejected, trading goes on as in phase 0. Subjects are given 12 minutes to study the instructions and to think about the proposal. Meanwhile, subjects can access data from the past 15 trading periods. The computer shows individual information (unit values, individual purchases, accumulated and per period earnings) as well as information on the market as a whole (market quantity and price for each period).
Before subjects cast their votes in the computerized ballot, they have to correctly answer several control questions. In particular, they have to calculate their individual redistribution income and their tax payment in case the proposal passes, assuming that the equilibrium quantity prevails. Subjects have to report their expectations about market prices and quantities for the subsequent periods 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13. Subjects report their expectations before the results of the referendum are announced, and they do so for both possible outcomes of the referendum. Expectations are motivated by monetary incentives. 
Results
We ran 20 laboratory markets in 2003 at the University of Innsbruck. 80 students from all disciplines at the University of Innsbruck participated in one of the two treatments. The average subject earned €28 (including a €4 show-up fee) within about 2.5 hours. The experiments were programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1998 ).
This study yields two main results. First, fiscal illusion distorts democratic decisions and leads to "excessive" redistribution when voters are inexperienced. In particular, redistribution which causes voters to lose money is accepted in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is indirect, but rejected in 9 out of 10 cases when taxation is direct in the 1 st referendum. Below, we show step by step that the income-effects of redistribution are intransparent to subjects if it is financed by an indirect tax, and that it is indeed fiscal illusion that causes these distorted democratic outcomes. We begin by showing that markets equilibrated which implies that redistribution in fact caused monetary losses to voters (see 4.1). We then show that tax framing induced different expectations about the income-effects of the proposal in the two tax frames. Section 4.2 shows that voters correctly expected to lose with direct taxation while they expected to gain from redistribution with indirect taxation, and that these biased perceptions translated into voting decisions.
The second main result is that voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion to some extent. Section 4.3 shows that if the referendum is repeated under exactly the same conditions, expectations are more accurate, and fiscal illusion ceases to have a significant effect on redistribution. We also find some evidence of transfer learning. If voters who are experienced with referenda on transparent taxes are confronted with an intransparent tax, the distorting effects are less pronounced than if voters have no such experience.
Tax liability side equivalence and tax framing
With respect to market outcomes, we find the following: To test whether tax liability side equivalence holds, we run a regression of profits on the tax regime (= 1 in IT), phases, whether the proposal was accepted, with interaction effects for regime*acceptance, regime*phase, and regime*acceptance*phase (regression with robust standard errors, 20 clusters, n = 3600 observations, R 2 = 0.598). The only significant variable is the acceptance of the proposal. The estimated value is a loss of 16.79 points while the predicted value is a loss 16.66 points (see table 1 ). Most importantly, the estimate for the interaction term regime*acceptance is far from being significant (coefficient = -1.24, p = 0.638). This means that the acceptance of the proposal reduced profits almost exactly as theoretically predicted, and that the income-reducing effect of accepting the proposal was not different in the two tax regimes. From this, we conclude that markets almost perfectly equilibrated and that tax liability side equivalence in fact holds. 8 As a consequence, the two treatments indeed are different representations of the same decision situation.
Result R1
Perception of the tax burden and voting
Our main finding with respect to the perception of the tax burden is stated in result R2.
Result R2 Misperception of the tax burden is much more pronounced with the indirect tax than with the direct tax. Therefore, the indirect tax is intransparent, and tax framing causes fiscal illusion.
To provide support for result R2, we calculate a measure of misperception of the net tax burden from individual expectation data. Subjects report expectations on market prices and quantities for periods t = 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13 of the current phase in case the proposal is accepted and in case it is rejected. From these data, we calculate a measure of the perceived net tax burden for each subject, i.e., the expected change in net income from the acceptance of the proposal. We use the following notation: 
Tax
Per unit transaction tax of 25 points.
R i (t)
Measure of subject i's expected redistribution income.
, where m: number of sellers (= 2).
Measure of subject i's expected change in net income in period t from implementing the proposal.
In TT, the expected change in net income from redistribution in period t for buyer i is
The corresponding expression for the intransparent tax regime IT is
According to (1) and (2), the expected net tax burden consists of three elements: the change in expected market income, the expected redistribution income, and (in TT) an expected tax payment. From the per-period measures (1) and (2), we calculate a measure of the net tax burden for each subject over all T = 15 periods of the respective phase
To do so, we simply average expected net income changes over reported periods.
Suppose a subject expects no change in market income due to direct taxation. In this case, the first term in (1) is equal to zero. That is, the net tax burden in TT is the difference of the expected redistribution income R i (t) and the expected tax payment:
It is easy to see that (3) is always negative if m > 0. The intuition for this result is that the tax is paid and borne exclusively by the n buyers whereas the tax revenue is redistributed to all m + n market participants, including the m sellers. Hence, it should be cognitively price auction). Even though all subjects are symmetric by design, subjects may trade different quantities (in disequilibrium). The measure (1/n) e i q(t|j) therefore is an imperfect proxy for individual quantity expectations.
simple to perceive that the proposal results in income losses in TT because losses are correctly expected given the correct expectation that market income remains constant. Now consider the intransparent tax regime IT. Suppose again a subject expects his or her market income to remain unaffected by the tax. In this case, however, the assumption of constant market income is incorrect, and would lure a subject to believe that he or she gains from redistribution:
Therefore, to correctly perceive a loss from redistribution, a subject has to perceive that market income falls at least by R i (t), or, assuming unchanged quantities, that prices rise at least by two thirds of the imposed indirect tax [= n / (n+m) . Tax]. Therefore, it is cognitively difficult to perceive that the indirect tax will result in income losses because losses are only correctly predicted if a considerable price increase is correctly expected.
How did expectations on the income-effect of the proposal ∆E i differ across tax regimes in the 1 st referendum? The average subject expected to lose 9.9 points of net income in TT, but to gain 10.3 points in IT. According to a Mann-Whitney test, income expectations are different between IT and TT at all conventional levels of significance (p = 0.000). Since subjects in fact lost income if the proposal was accepted (see section 4.1), the average misperception of the net tax burden was much more pronounced in IT than in TT.
In principle, tax framing could affect the misperception of the net tax burden through price or quantity expectations [see equations (1) and (2) 
Learning to overcome fiscal illusion
The main result with respect to learning is
Result R3
Fiscal illusion causes excessive redistribution when voters are inexperienced.
With experience, fiscal illusion is still present at the individual level, but induces no redistribution. Experience and transfer learning explain this evolution.
Support for result R3 comes from figure 4. The figure shows acceptance rates of the proposal in the respective referenda. As can be seen, tax framing has a very pronounced effect when voters are inexperienced. However, the effect of tax framing is smaller in the 2 nd than in the 1 st , and almost completely vanishes in the 3 rd referendum. In particular, the proposal is accepted in 50 percent of the cases in IT, and in 20 percent of the cases in TT in the 2 nd referendum, and there is almost no difference in acceptance rates in the 3 rd referendum across tax frames (30 and 20 percent, respectively). We now argue that this vanishing effect of fiscal illusion can be explained by experience learning and by transfer learning. Experience learning is simply the ability of subjects to take better decisions in an environment in which subjects are experienced. To assess experience learning, we compare the 1 st and the 2 nd phase within each treatment.
In TT, subjects on average expected to lose 9.9 points in the 1 st referendum, and to lose 20.5 points in the 2 nd . To test whether these expectations are different, we take average expectations over all subjects in a market as units of observation. We find that expectations are not significantly more accurate in the 2 nd than in the 1 st referendum according to a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p = 0.114). This absence of experience learning should not be too surprising since the proposal was rejected in almost all markets in TT in the 1 st referendum. In other words, since almost everyone "got it right" from the beginning, there was not much scope for learning.
In IT, experience learning should be more pronounced since redistribution is accepted in almost all markets in the 1 st referendum. In IT, subjects expected to gain 10. Transfer learning is the ability of subjects to take what has been learned in one economic environment and to generalize it to related environments (see Cooper and Kagel 2003) . In the context of our investigation, transfer learning means that subjects who are experienced with one tax regime take better decisions in the other tax regime than subjects without such experience. To test for transfer learning, we compare expectations ∆E i in the 3 rd referendum in one treatment with the 1 st referendum in the other treatment.
In TT, subjects on average expect to lose 9.9 points without experience (1 st referendum in TT-TT-IT), while they expect to lose 19.8 points with experience (3 rd referendum in IT-IT-TT). These averages are not significantly different according to a one-sided Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.227, group averages as units of observation). Given this insignificant effect on expectations, it is no surprise that transfer learning has no significant effect on redistribution outcomes in TT. In the 1 st referendum, the proposal was accepted once, and was accepted twice in the 3 rd referendum which is far from being significantly different (χ 2 = 0.39, p = 0.531). Hence, there is no evidence of transfer learning in TT.
In IT, subjects on average expect to gain 10.3 points without experience (1 st referendum in IT-IT-TT), while they expect to lose 4.2 points with experience (3 rd referendum in TT-TT-IT). These averages are significantly different according to a one-sided Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.034, based on group averages). Did this significant effect of transfer learning on expectations translate into referendum outcomes in IT? In the 1 st referendum, the acceptance rate of the proposal was three times higher than in the 3 rd referendum (see figure 4) . This difference is significant according to a chi-square test (χ 2 = 7.50, p = 0.006). Therefore, the effect of fiscal illusion on the acceptance of redistribution is significantly weaker if voters are experienced with a similar proposal than if they are not. 
Summary and conclusion
John Stuart Mill (1848) suggested indirect taxation as a cause, and distorted fiscal choices leading to excessive government spending as a consequence of fiscal illusion. While plausible, the Mill hypothesis is empirically highly controversial. The reason is that it appears to be difficult, if not impossible, to test the Mill hypothesis with field data. As a consequence, the empirical literature on fiscal illusion failed to provide unambiguous evidence for the existence and relevance of fiscal illusion. There are two reasons for this failure. First, field studies are frequently beset with measurement problems, and a misperception is particularly difficult to measure. The second reason is more fundamental, and methodological in nature.
There are three canonical principles in standard economics: rationality, self-interest and equilibrium. To clearly isolate fiscal illusion (which is a violation of the rationality assumption) one has to investigate an environment in which the other two principles apply. In naturally occurring economies, however, one usually cannot establish beyond doubt whether these principles fully apply.
We claim that our experimental study meets the requirements to isolate the causes and consequences of fiscal illusion. To test for the existence of fiscal illusion, we elicit taxpayers'
estimates of the tax burden and compare these perceptions to the actual tax burden. To test whether tax framing causes fiscal illusion, we implement two treatments which exclusively differ with respect to direct vs. indirect taxation. In particular, the two tax regimes are identical with respect to efficiency and rent distribution. Our main hypothesis is that the tax burden resulting from indirect taxation is cognitively more difficult to perceive than the one from direct taxation because indirect taxes are incorporated in market prices. To investigate the consequences of fiscal illusion, we observe whether a misperception of the net tax burden translates into redistribution.
Our results clearly show that fiscal illusion has powerful effects when voters are inexperienced. Redistribution is accepted in 90 percent of the referenda if it is financed by an intransparent tax while it is rejected in 90 percent of the referenda if it is transparently financed. However, voters eventually learn to overcome fiscal illusion to some extent. Fiscal illusion continues to distort expectations of twice experienced voters but ceases to induce excessive redistribution.
Our study for the first time provides unambiguous evidence supporting the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion. To be able to test the Mill hypothesis, we created a simple, highly stylized decision environment. Despite the clear results of our study, we believe that further research on the causes and consequences of fiscal illusion in more complex environments is needed.
With respect to the causes of fiscal illusion, we show that indirect taxation is cognitively intransparent because the tax is incorporated ("hidden") in the product price. However, the degree to which indirect taxes are cognitively intransparent in practice may depend on the particular "framing" of indirect taxes. For example, the tax payment is stated separately on receipts in some cases (e.g., VAT), but not in other cases (e.g., excise taxes). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Slemrod and Krishna (2003) , and McCaffery (1994) for a survey.
With respect to the consequences of fiscal illusion, our design was chosen to distinguish fiscal illusion from other explanations of distorted voting. For example, our design minimizes the possibility that a concern for a fair distribution affects voting decisions. However, fairness considerations are important in voting on redistribution (see Tyran and Sausgruber 2002) .
These considerations may interact with fiscal illusion, and may exacerbate or mitigate its effects.
Our design forwards learning, and this may have biased results against long-run effects of fiscal illusion. Learning is facilitated because our experimental environment is simple and stable, and the information feedback we provide is rich and unambiguous. In contrast, natural environments are much more noisy, and it may be much more difficult to overcome fiscal illusion there. On the other hand, the long-run effects of fiscal illusion may depend on opportunities to communicate (see Frey and Bohnet 1994) which were absent in our design but are present in the field.
This study investigated whether fiscal illusion translates into distorted fiscal choices by means of a (direct democratic) referendum. This is a natural choice since it is the simplest democratic mechanism, and it is in fact used in some places to determine fiscal choices (e.g., in Switzerland and some U.S. states, see Butler and Ranney 1994) . However, fiscal choices are frequently made indirectly (representative democracy). In a seminal paper, Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) have provided evidence that the type of democratic institutions may have important consequences for the pervasiveness of fiscal illusion. We believe that the interaction of institutions and cognitive limitations has important implications for taxation and the size of government. Therefore, this interaction deserves much more attention from economists than at present.
In our view, our results raise serious doubts about the rationality of fiscal choices involving indirect taxation. Since indirect taxation (in the guise of value-added taxes, energy taxes, social security contributions etc.) is widespread and of growing importance in modern democracies, our findings are of great potential importance. However, the discussion above reminds us to be cautious with simple extrapolation of such findings. In particular, the issue of under which (institutional) conditions voters are able to overcome fiscal illusion remains to be further explored. In terms of policy advice, our findings support the venerable presumption that a transparent tax structure advances the rationality of political decisions.
